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I INTRODUCTION 
A Background to Gender Inequality in Australian Workplaces 
For almost 30 years, Australia has had affirmative action or equal opportunity 
legislation.  Despite this, women still face gender inequality in the workplace and the 
glass ceiling is still firmly in existence.  The 2012 Australian Census of Women in 
Leadership found that women comprise only 9.2 per cent of executives in ASX 500 
companies.1  The Census also found that there has been ‘negligible growth in the 
number of female executives.’2  This is concerning as it means women are not in the 
‘pipeline’ to board positions.3  Similarly, a 2013 report by BlackRock found that the 
growth of women on boards continues at a ‘glacial pace.’4 
 
Another area of concern is the persistent gender pay gap.  In November 2012, 
the gender pay gap stood at 17.6 per cent, which is slightly poorer than the previous 
year.5  On average, a woman working full-time earns $261.60 per week less than a 
man.6  The effect of this on a woman’s superannuation savings is also significant: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency, 2012 Australian Census of 
Women in Leadership, 9 
<http://www.wgea.gov.au/sites/default/files/2012_CENSUS%20REPORT.pdf> 
Accessed 24 September 2013. 
2 Ibid 4. 
3 Ibid. 
4 BlackRock, Glacial change in diversity at ASX 200 companies: can corporate 
Australia escape the imposition of diversity quotas? (4 June 2013) Workplace Gender 
Equality Agency, 2 
<http://www.wgea.gov.au/sites/default/files/BlackRock_Glacial_Change_in_Diversit
y_at_ASX200_companies.pdf> Accessed 24 September 2013. 
5 Workplace Gender Equality Agency, Gender Pay Gap Statistics (February 2013), 1 
<http://www.wgea.gov.au/sites/default/files/2013-02-
Gender%20pay%20gap%20statistics.pdf> Accessed 24 September 2013. 
6 Ibid. 
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women generally have 59 per cent the superannuation of men at retirement age.7  
Many people may point to a woman’s choice to take time out of the workforce to 
have children as the reason for a decrease in superannuation.  However, there is 
research to suggest that the disparity exists even in the case of a woman who has 
taken no time out of the workforce and does not have children.8  Nor can maternity 
leave explain the inequality that emerges at the very start of a woman’s career: a 2012 
report by Graduate Careers Australia found that male graduates start out on a median 
salary of $55,000 and female graduates on $50,000.9  Despite possessing the same 
qualifications, male graduates are receiving higher starting salaries than their female 
counterparts across a wide range of industries.10 
 
B The role of law? 
 The reality is that unconscious bias and discrimination against women has not 
been eradicated, and simply being female in the workplace comes at a price.  This is 
at odds with the recognition by both the Australian community and government that 
gender equality is a necessary pursuit.  Gender equality represents the values of social 
justice and diversity, but has also been linked to increased productivity and 
competition.  The government has particularly used the economic justification for 
gender equality as a main selling point since first enacting affirmative action 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See Prue Cameron, 'What’s choice got to do with it? Women’s lifetime financial 
disadvantage and the superannuation gender pay gap' (Policy Brief No. 55, The 
Australia Institute, July 2013) 2. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Graduate Careers Australia, Graduate Employment: Long-term Prospects Stronger 
(14 December 2012), 2 <http://www.graduatecareers.com.au/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/GCA-GradStats-2012.pdf> Accessed 24 September 2013. 
10 See ibid 8. 
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legislation in 1986.11  More recent research undertaken by Goldman Sachs suggests 
that closing the gender gap would boost Australia’s GDP by 11 per cent.12  Given the 
social and economic benefits of gender equality, achieving substantive equality for 
women is an important issue requiring serious consideration and workable solutions. 
 
 The lingering question is why has past legislation failed thus far to achieve 
true gender equality?  Is there even a role for law to play in this area?  This paper will 
examine the new Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 (Cth) (‘WGE Act’) to 
consider whether it is possible for law to have an impact on a social issue like gender 
equality.  I will explore the potential effectiveness of the new Act by firstly 
comparing it to its predecessors: the Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for 
Women) Act 1986 (Cth) and the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 
1999 (Cth).  At first, it may seem that although the WGE Act offers improvements, it 
ultimately suffers from the same weak enforcement mechanisms of the past.  
However, the WGE Act’s potential for success can be found through understanding 
the intended regulatory approach of the Act. 
 
This paper will show that the WGE Act utilises an alternative regulatory tool 
known as ‘informational regulation.’  This tool attempts to achieve social change and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Margaret Thornton, 'Proactive or reactive? The Senate Report on the Equal 
Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Amendment Bill 2012 (Cth)' (2012) 25 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 284, 288. 
12 Goldman Sachs JBWere, Goldman Sachs JBWere release research on gender 
participation and productivity (30 November 2009) 
<http://www.gs.com.au/documents/about/mediaroom/2009/gender_research_report_2
009.pdf> Accessed 24 September 2013. 
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influence behaviour by improving the availability of information.13  Informational 
regulation can be considered a form of ‘light touch’ or ‘soft’ regulation.14  By 
contrast, ‘hard strategies’ or ‘command and control’ legal regulation involves the 
traditional use of rules and sanctions.15  In this paper, I will particularly draw on Arie 
Freiberg’s work on informational regulation to demonstrate how the WGE Act’s 
provision for information disclosure and education may improve its chances of 
success. 16  Finally, I will argue that the value of hard rules and sanctions has been 
overstated and that when dealing with a complex social issue like gender equality, 
soft regulation like informational regulation may provide a better way for the law to 
effect change. 
 
It should be noted that the WGE Act removes the past usage of the word 
‘women’ in the title of the Act in order to be gender neutral and apply to both men 
and women.  This paper, however, will focus on gender equality in the context of 
women because it is generally women who, in practice, experience gender 
disadvantage.17  The WGE Act is not the only piece of legislation aimed at achieving 
gender equality for women.  The Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (‘SDA’) also 
plays a significant role in prohibiting discrimination against women in the workplace.  
Section 7D of the SDA even permits the taking of special measures for the purpose of 
achieving substantive equality between men and women.  This provision has also !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text 
and Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 96. 
14 See, eg, John Howe and Ingrid Landau, ''Light Touch' Labour Regulation by State 
Governments in Australia' (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law Review 367. 
15 Ibid 370.  
16 Arie Freiberg, The Tools of Regulation (The Federation Press, 2010). 
17 See also Reg Graycar and Jenny Morgan, 'Equality Unmodified?' in Margaret 
Thornton (ed), Sex Discrimination in Uncertain Times (ANU E Press, 2010) 175, 177. 
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been interpreted as permitting ‘hard’ forms of affirmative action such as quotas.18  
However, s 7D does not actually require employers to take special measures and it has 
rarely been implemented in practice.19 
 
 The SDA has received comprehensive consideration in the literature, 
including in the form of regulatory analysis.20  Instead, I have chosen to focus solely 
on the WGE Act because it is a new piece of legislation and an under-explored area 
within the discourse on gender equality.  I have also chosen to explore the WGE Act 
through a broader regulatory framework because this best reveals the scope and 
intended operation of legislation in general.  As Smith suggests, we need to consider 
how other regulatory methods, such as education, support direct legal regulation.21  
By looking at legislation broadly, and not just the rules and sanctions created, we are 
better able to make an informed judgment on whether an Act can be successful in 
practice.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Jacomb v Australian Municipal Administrative Clerical & Services Union (2004) 
140 FCR 149; Sarah Stephens, 'Adopting, a positive action approach to sex 
discrimination' (2010) 35 Alternative Law Journal 36, 36. 
19 Stephens, above n 18, 36. 
20 See especially Belinda Smith, 'A Regulatory Analysis of the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth): Can it effect equality or only redress harm?' in Christopher Arup et al 
(eds), Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation - Essays on the Construction, 
Constitution and Regulation of Labour Markets and Work Relationships (Federation 
Press, 2006) 105. 
21 Ibid 106. 
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II WORKPLACE GENDER EQUALITY ACT 2012: CHANGE OR 
MORE OF THE SAME? 
A Lessons from the Past 
 In order to judge whether the WGE Act can have an effective role in 
redressing gender inequality in the workplace, it is important to firstly understand the 
weaknesses of previous equal employment opportunity (‘EEO’) legislation.  The 
Hawke government passed the first legislative attempt to promote the participation of 
women in the workforce through the Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for 
Women) Act 1986 (Cth) (‘AA(EOW) Act’).  The 1986 Act applied only to private 
sector employers with more than 100 staff and to all higher education institutions.22  
This limitation has continued in subsequent legislation, including the 2012 Act. 
 
The AA(EOW) Act required employers to develop affirmative action 
programs that incorporated 8 steps, including: consulting with unions and employees, 
reviewing employment policies to identify discrimination, setting objectives and 
numerical forward estimates and monitoring progress.23  The Affirmative Action 
Agency was also established and a report was required to be submitted to the Agency 
on an annual basis.  Non-compliance did not relate to any failure to achieve 
substantive outcomes, but rather the mere failure to submit a report.24  The sanction 
for not submitting a report was to be named in Parliament in the Agency’s annual 
report.25  After a review of the Act in 1992, an additional sanction was added to bar 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 (Cth) s 3. 
23 Ibid s 8.  
24 Thornton, ‘Proactive or reactive?’, above n 11, 286. 
25 Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 (Cth) s 19. 
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non-compliant companies from competing for government contracts, but this sanction 
has never been enforced.26  
 
The AA(EOW) Act was criticised by scholars and Valerie Braithwaite 
described it as ‘loose, gentle and weak’ legislation.27  Arguably, there were two major 
faults with the Act.  Firstly, it was concerned only with the process of submitting a 
report and did not prescribe substantive outcomes or require the employer to take 
specific actions to encourage gender equality.28  Due to the lack benchmarks, 
employers could essentially give their own meaning to the requirements to ‘set 
objectives’ and make ‘forward estimates.’29  This approach raises doubt over the 
quality of employers’ reports.  The Agency did have limited resources to assess some 
reports, and in 1995 it introduced a five-point assessment scale ranging from non-
compliance to outstanding level of progress.30  However, these classifications did not 
relate to actual outcomes the employer had achieved in the workplace, but rather how 
well the reports complied with the eight steps under the Act.31  Again, the focus was 
on the process and not real outcomes. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Valerie Braithwaite and Janine Bush, 'Affirmative Action in Australia: A 
Consensus-Based Dialogic Approach' (1998) 10 National Women’s Studies 
Association Journal 115, 118; Thornton, ‘Proactive or reactive?, above n 11, 290. 
27 Valerie Braithwaite, 'Designing the process of workplace change through the 
Affirmative Action Act' in Moira Gatens and Alison Mackinnon (eds), Gender and 
Institutions: Welfare, Work and Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 1998) 107, 
117. 
28 See also Alison Mackinnon, 'Towards gender equality: two steps forward, one step 
back? Equal opportunity from Hawke to Rudd' in Gerry Bloustien, Barbara Comber 
and Alison Mackinnon (eds), The Hawke Legacy (Wakefield Press, 2009) 45, 48; 
Beth Gaze, 'The Ambiguity of Affirmative Action in Australia' (1998) 15 Law in 
Context 136  
29 Thornton, ‘Proactive or reactive?’, above n 11, 286. 
30 Gaze, above n 28, 158. 
31 Ibid. 
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Strachan and Burgess undertook an independent study of reports submitted to 
the Agency between 1993-1999 to assess their quality.32  They found that about one 
quarter of complying organisations met their legal requirements by submitting a 
report, but in reality did very little to advance equal employment opportunity.33  
Strachan and Burgess also assessed the reported policies instituted by the 
organisations and discovered problems with the reporting process.34  Given that the 
organisations were only required to tick a box, Strachan and Burgess discovered that 
it was likely that some were overstating the actions they had taken, for example in the 
area of childcare assistance.35  The reality of the AA(EOW) Act’s operation meant 
that employers could market themselves as promoting gender equality, without 
actually making significant internal changes. 
 
The second problem of the AA(EOW) Act was its weak enforcement 
mechanisms.  The Act’s only real sanction was ‘naming and shaming,’ yet there 
appeared to be no real shame involved.  In their study, Strachan and Burgess 
concluded that a ‘number of employers do not care if they are named in parliament.’36  
Margaret Thornton has even claimed that some employers regarded being named in 
Parliament as a ‘badge of honour.’37  Of course, not all employers lack interest in 
achieving gender equality and many are committed to changing their practices 
regardless of the threat of sanctions, as they see it as more productive for their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Glenda Strachan and John Burgess, 'W(h)ither Affirmative Action Legislation in 
Australia?' (2000) 5(2) Journal of Interdisciplinary Gender Studies 46. 
33 Ibid 53. 
34 Ibid 54. 
35 Ibid 55. 
36 Ibid 50. 
37 Thornton, ‘Proactive or reactive?’, above n 11, 286. 
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business.  But where employers do not see the value of gender equality practices for 
their business, the issue on how to best utilise law to encourage compliance is 
particularly critical.  Despite the AA(EOW) Act’s weaknesses and its benign 
approach to enforcement, employers still complained about the Act.38  Eventually, it 
became the subject of a review by the Howard government in 1998. 
 
The review led to the AA(EOW) Act being repealed and replaced with the 
Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 1999 (Cth) (‘EOWW Act’).  The 
Affirmative Action Agency became the Equal Opportunity for Women in the 
Workplace Agency (‘EOWA’).  The EOWW Act provided an even less effective 
framework for achieving equal employment opportunity for women than the 
AA(EOW) Act and led to what Andrea North-Samardzic has described as the 
‘devolution of Australia’s EEO regulatory framework.’39  Generally, the Howard era 
has been criticised by feminist scholars as being a step backwards for women’s 
rights.40  In relation to the EOWW Act, Thornton attributes the decline to the Howard 
government’s neo-liberal deregulation agenda and fear that ‘affirmative action’ 
carried the connotation of quotas (hence the change in the Act’s title).41   
 
Despite the AA(EOW) Act’s faults, it showed more promise than its 
successor.  The EOWW Act reduced the already limited reporting requirements under !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Ibid. 
39 Andrea North-Samardzic, 'Looking Back to Move Forward: The (D)evolution of 
Australia’s EEO Regulatory Framework' (2009) 20 The Economic and Labour 
Relations Review 59. 
40 See, eg, Mackinnon, above n 28; Anne Summers, The End of Equality: Work, 
Babies and Women's Choices in 21st Century Australia (Random House, 2003). 
41 Margaret Thornton, 'EEO in a Neo-Liberal Climate' (2001) 6(1) Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Gender Studies 77, 91. See also North-Samardzic, above n 39, 65. 
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the AA(EOW) Act.  It removed the ‘eight step’ affirmative action program under the 
old Act and introduced new ‘workplace program’ requirements, which included data 
relating to the workplace’s profile.’42  The EOWW Act particularly intended to 
remove the requirements to set ‘objectives’ and ‘forward estimates’ under the old 
eight-step program.43  Instead, employers were allowed to choose their own priority 
issues and identify the relevant action to be taken.44  The removal of ‘forward 
estimates’ reflected the wariness surrounding requirements to set quantitative goals 
and supports Thornton’s theory of the government and employers’ fear of quotas.  
Admittedly, compliance with the requirement to set ‘forward estimates’ was the 
lowest out of the eight steps under the AA(EOW) Act.45  Still, the eight steps allowed 
for some form of standardisation, whereas under the EOWW Act, organisations were 
completely free to choose the form of their reports.  
 
The lack of standardisation made it difficult to compare reports for the 
purposes of evaluation, meaning that the EOWW Act also removed the Agency’s 
ability to assess the reports according to its five-point classification model.46  As such, 
the employer itself undertook the only evaluation of reports.47  There was no 
independent auditing, and the EOWW Act also removed the requirement to consult 
with unions (step three under the old eight step program).  The EOWW Act did not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Explanatory Memorandum, Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace 
Amendment Bill 1999 (Cth); Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 
1999 (Cth) s 13. 
43 Thornton, ‘Proactive or reactive?’, above n 11, 286. 
44 Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 1999 (Cth) s 13. 
45 Gaze, above n 28, 157. 
46 See also Belinda Smith, 'Not the Baby and the Bathwater – Regulatory Reform for 
Equality Laws to Address Work-Family Conflict' (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 689, 
722. 
47 Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 1999 (Cth) s 13(3). 
!Page 11 of 54 
even require employers to improve on their previous reports or explain a lack of 
improvement.  It appears that the whole system relied on employers’ willingness to 
self-regulate, yet provided very little external pressure for them to assess their own 
practices or take the contents of their report seriously.  This is particularly a problem 
in the case of employers who do not already recognise the value of gender equality, 
and without such external pressure will not feel the need to assess their practices.  
Even in the case of committed employers, many will likely face resourcing 
constraints, and without some external pressure they may eventually relegate gender 
equality issues to a low priority status. 
 
Additionally, the EOWW Act made it easier for an employer to be excused 
from reporting.  Under the AA(EOW) Act, the Agency could waive reporting 
requirements if it was satisfied that the employer had complied with the Act 
(including the eight step program) for three consecutive years.48  Given that the 
EOWW Act removed the eight-step program, employers could instead be granted a 
waiver if they could demonstrate ‘all reasonably practicable measures’ had been taken 
to ‘address the issues relating to employment matters that affect equal opportunity for 
women in relation to the employer’s workplace.’49  The phrase ‘all reasonably 
practicable measures’ meant that the Agency could take into account any limits or 
constraints the employer faced,50 hence it was an easier test to satisfy.  The 
requirement of three consecutive years of compliance with the Act was retained.  It is 
questionable why any waiver of reporting was needed in either Act, particularly if the 
goal is long term and lasting equal employment opportunity for women.  If employers !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 (Cth) s 13A. 
49 Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 1999 (Cth) s13C. 
50 North-Samardzic, above n 39, 64. 
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can be exempt after only three years, then some employers who feel that they have no 
direct business interest in redressing gender equality may lose momentum and stop 
having regard to gender equality issues.  Even employers who do have an interest may 
start to put gender issues on the backburner if they are faced with competing interests 
or a lack of resources, and are already exempt from reporting.  
 
B Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 
Having identified the deficiencies in the preceding Acts’ regulatory 
frameworks, the next issue is whether the new WGE Act further weakens Australia’s 
approach to equal employment opportunity for women or offers real improvements.  
The WGE Act received assent on 6 December 2012, but with some of its changes not 
taking effect until the 2014-2015 reporting period.  The first notable change of the 
WGE Act is the change in the Act’s title and renaming of the EOWA to the 
Workplace Gender Equality Agency (‘WGEA’).  This move to gender neutral 
language may be viewed by some as a backward step.51  When the AA(EOW) Act 
was first enacted, it was viewed as a radical (and promising) step to recognise the 
specific disadvantage faced by women as opposed to gender neutral discrimination.52  
However the WGE Act’s gender neutrality is unlikely to be a significant weakness.  
As many feminist scholars have noted, we should promote the idea of men sharing 
domestic work and caring responsibilities.53  For example, allowing men access to 
flexible working arrangements can positively serve the women’s rights movement.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 See, eg, Thornton, ‘Proactive or reactive?’ above n 11, 287. 
52 Gaze, above n 28, 169.  
53 See, eg, Belinda Smith and Joellen Riley, 'Family-friendly Work Practices and the 
Law' (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 395, 397. 
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Whilst the gender neutrality issue is unlikely to be determinative of the WGE 
Act’s success, its ability to generate substantive equality will be very important.  As 
has been demonstrated, the previous versions of the Act focused too much on process 
and not enough on achieving substantive outcomes.  When the EOWW Act was 
reviewed in 2009, most submissions also made this complaint.54  The WGE Act 
attempts to address this by making a number of changes.  Firstly, beginning with the 
reporting period of 1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014,55 employers will be required to 
include information relating to gender equality indicators (‘GEIs’) in their annual 
reports to the WGEA.56  This will replace the old EOWW Act reports.   
 
The WGE Act introduced five GEIs,57 and the Workplace Gender Equality 
(Matters in relation to Gender Equality Indicators) Instrument 2013 (No. 1) (Cth) 
(‘2013 Instrument’) specifies further matters in relation to each GEI, which the 
Minister is required to do under the WGE Act.58  The first GEI requires employers to 
provide information relating to the gender composition of the workforce.  Relevant 
matters include each employee’s, classification (manager or non-manager), 
occupation and employment status.59  It is possible to view this as similar to the 
requirement under the EOWW Act for employers to provide a ‘workplace profile’ and 
at first glance does not appear to offer any real change.  However, the matters !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 KPMG, ‘Review of the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 1999 
Consultation Report’, Report for the Office of Women, Department of Families, 
Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, Australian Government, 2010, 
50. 
55 Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 cl 1(1) 
56 Ibid s 13. 
57 Ibid s 3(1). 
58 Ibid s 13(3) 
59 Workplace Gender Equality (Matters in relation to Gender Equality Indicators) 
Instrument 2013 (No. 1) (Cth) sch 1 cl 1. 
!Page 14 of 54 
specified in the 2013 Instrument for this GEI allows it to go further than past 
attempts.  For the current reporting period (April 2013 – March 2014), Employers are 
required to report on the existence of strategies or policies to support gender 
equality.60  From 1 April 2014, employers will also have to provide information, 
categorised by gender and manager/non-manager, in relation to: the composition of 
recruitment applications; the composition of applicants interviewed; the composition 
of applicants appointed to positions; the number and proportion of employees 
awarded promotions; and the number and proportion of employees who have 
resigned.61  
 
In addition to these more extensive content requirements, this GEI intends to 
gather the data in a more standardised format than under the EOWW Act.62  
Generally, all of the GEIs offer an improvement on previous legislation because, at 
the very least, they require a standardised form for employers’ reports.  This allows 
reports to be compared to competitors’ reports and evaluated, which, as has been 
demonstrated, was not possible under the EOWW Act.  Admittedly, this was also 
somewhat possible under the AA(EOW) Act.  Yet, unlike the AA(EOW) Act’s eight 
steps, the other GEIs relate to specific issues of gender equality. 
 
In this sense, the other GEIs are entirely new developments and are aimed 
more at achieving substantive outcomes.  The second GEI is the gender composition 
of governing bodies of relevant employers.  This will generate information regarding 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Ibid sch 1 cl 1.2. 
61 Ibid sch 2 cl 1.3–1.7 
62 Explanatory Memorandum, Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace 
Amendment Bill 2012 (Cth) 13. 
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the number of women on the organisation’s board or other governing authority.63  
Employers will also have to provide information on any targets that have been set and 
the existence of a selection policy or strategy.64  Even though the 2013 Instrument set 
no external targets, this still demonstrates movement away from the previous fears 
surrounding any mention of targets or quotas.  The third GEI is equal remuneration 
between women and men.  This GEI requires the employer to provide information on 
remuneration policies, whether a pay gap analysis has been undertaken and any action 
taken as a result of a pay analysis.65  Ultimately, these two GEIs demonstrate progress 
toward the acknowledgement of two particularly persistent gender inequality issues in 
Australia: the glass ceiling and gender pay gap.66  
 
The fourth GEI is the availability and utility of flexible or supportive working 
arrangements for employees with family or caring responsibilities.  The 2013 
Instrument also provides for extensive content requirements in relation to this GEI.67 
This GEI acknowledges another particularly important gender equality issue in 
Australia, because it is usually the woman who bears the burden of family or caring 
responsibilities.  As Smith argues, gender inequality will persist unless the notion of 
the ideal worker being ‘unencumbered and always available’ to work is challenged.68  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 This GEI is intended to complement the new ASX guidelines requiring ASX listed 
companies to provide information on the number of women on their boards, in senior 
management and across their organisation. See ibid 14.  
64 Workplace Gender Equality (Matters in relation to Gender Equality Indicators) 
Instrument 2013 (No. 1) (Cth) sch 1 cl 2. 
65 Ibid sch 1 cl 3. 
66 See Introduction. 
67 See Workplace Gender Equality (Matters in relation to Gender Equality Indicators) 
Instrument 2013 (No. 1) (Cth) sch 1 cl 4. 
68 Belinda Smith, 'What Kind of Equality Can We Expect From The Fair Work Act?' 
(2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 545, 549. 
!Page 16 of 54 
By including this GEI, the WGE Act is arguably taking a step towards normalising 
the idea of flexible work arrangements in workplace cultures.  It will also clarify what 
measures employers are already taking to support workers with family or caring 
responsibilities.  As such, this information can also be potentially used to uncover 
deficiencies in employers’ approach to flexible working arrangements. 
 
The fifth GEI is consultation with employees on issues concerning gender 
equality in the workplace.  The importance of consultation, particularly in relation to 
flexible work arrangements under the fourth GEI, will be further explored in the next 
part of this paper.  Lastly, the WGE Act also permits the Minister to introduce new 
GEIs (provided the Minister consults with the WGEA and employer and employee 
groups).69  This provides flexibility to address new gender equality issues as they 
emerge.70  This avenue has been utilised to create a sixth GEI under sch 1 cl 6 of the 
2013 Instrument.  Under this sixth GEI, employers are required to report on sex-based 
harassment and discrimination in the workplace.  This includes matters relating to 
prevention strategies, grievance processes and workplace training. 
 
Overall, it is not difficult to conclude that the WGE Act is an improvement 
compared to its predecessors.  The AA(EOW) Act and EOWW Act essentially 
allowed organisations to resist change and put in minimal effort because the Acts 
prescribed very little content requirements for reports.  By contrast, we have seen that 
the WGE Act requires employers to provide more extensive information in their 
reports and acknowledge specified gender inequality issues through the GEIs.  Yet, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 (Cth) s 3(1)(f). 
70 Explanatory Memorandum, Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace 
Amendment Bill 2012 (Cth), 15. 
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the collection of information and data alone cannot force substantive outcomes.  As 
such, a key issue is whether the WGE Act goes far enough to redress the lack of 
benchmarks or targets in the AA(EOW) Act and EOWW Act.  The WGE Act’s 
answer to this problem is to provide that the Minister is required to set minimum 
standards for each GEI in a legislative instrument by April 2014.71  The Minister must 
also consult with the WGEA and relevant stakeholders in developing the minimum 
standards.72 
 
This means that for the 2014-2015 reporting period, employers will be 
required to meet minimum standards.  The minimum standards set the level of 
achievement expected for each GEI and may relate to quantitative outcomes or 
evidence of actions taken that are aimed at improving quantitative outcomes.73  
Although the minimum standards have not yet been created, the Explanatory 
Memorandum claims that the development of the standards will be industry specific 
and evidence-based.74 The WGEA will analyse the information it collects in order to 
advise the Minister on the development of the minimum standards.75 
 
It is debatable whether the minimum standards will enable the WGE Act to 
achieve substantive outcomes.  Although it is difficult to assess this before the 
standards are released, there are some potential flaws.  For example, as Carolyn 
Sutherland notes, there is a danger that the standards will be set too low and cause 
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74 Ibid 28-29. 
75 Ibid 28. 
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employers who are already exceeding the standards to lose motivation or interest.76  
Sutherland still appears to retain some optimism regarding the new system, and 
describes it as an ‘outcomes-based system,’ because employers report on outcomes 
instead of processes.77  Thornton takes a more cautious approach and has written (in 
relation to the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Amendment Bill 2012 
(Cth), just before the WGE Act was passed) that to conclude there had been a shift 
from a procedural to a substantive approach would be an ‘over-statement.’78  
Thornton’s comments are perhaps in response to what constitutes compliance with the 
minimum standards.     
 
 The greatest potential downfall of the minimum standards system is that 
employers are not actually required to meet the new standards in order to comply with 
the Act.  Instead, employers who fail to meet a minimum standard are only required to 
improve on their own performance, rather than actually achieve the standard.79  An 
employer who does not show improvement will be considered non-compliant with the 
Act, unless they have a reasonable excuse.80  Employers are given two years to 
improve, meaning no employer can be found non-compliant on this basis until 2017.81  
Some may question what purpose the introduction of minimum standards can have if 
the WGE Act is not actually going to require them to be met.  Yet, there are still a 
number of benefits to the requirement to improve on previous reports.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 Carolyn Sutherland, 'Reframing the regulation of equal employment opportunity: 
The Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 (Cth)' (2013) 26(1) Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 102, 111. 
77 Ibid 104-105. 
78 Thornton, ‘Proactive or reactive?’, above n 11, 290-291.  
79 Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 (Cth), s 19C. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
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As has been demonstrated, one of the significant failings of the EOWW Act 
system was that it did not require employers to monitor progress, improve or explain a 
lack of improvement.  By redressing this, the WGE Act has for the first time taken a 
step toward creating imperatives for employers to adequately self-regulate their 
behaviour.  Another benefit of the Act’s minimum standards system is that the 
WGEA no longer has to undertake a subjective evaluation of employers’ reports.  
Instead, the standards will play an important part in generating objective expectations 
and will take the guesswork out of deciding the adequacy of a report.  Also, by 
requiring continuous improvement, it is reasonable to expect employers to eventually 
attain the expected standard.   
 
Although at first it is perhaps easier to write off the WGE Act’s changes as 
void of substance, a deeper investigation reveals that the Act does contain these 
significant benefits.  As such, this paper contends that it would not be an ‘over-
statement’ to suggest there has been a shift from a procedural to a substantive 
approach, despite Thornton’s reservations.  The WGE Act shows a clear intention to 
address substantive issues and is aimed at achieving results.  Admittedly, while there 
has been a shift in intention, we will still have to wait for the release of the minimum 
standards before making any final conclusion on the Act’s ability to actually achieve 
substantive outcomes.  
 
The second significant deficiency of the AA(EOW) and EOWW Acts was the 
weak enforcement mechanisms in place to deal with non-compliance.  Unlike the 
substantive approach issue, critics are less likely to conclude here that the WGE Act 
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offers improvement.  The WGE Act appears to essentially retain the same ‘naming 
and shaming’ approach of AA(EOW) and EOWW Acts.  The WGEA can name non-
compliant employers in a report to the Minister or by electronic or other means, such 
as on the WGEA’s website or in a newspaper.82  As with the EOWW Act, an 
employer is non-compliant if it fails to lodge a report on time or comply with the 
WGEA’s request for additional information on the report.83  The WGE Act also 
creates additional categories of non-compliance: a failure to meet the new 
consultation requirements and including false or misleading information in a report or 
information to the WGEA.84   
 
Given that it has been demonstrated that, in the past, employers have generally 
been indifferent to being named, critics may consider the WGE Act’s retention of this 
approach to be its downfall.  Some may question why there has not been greater 
development to the compliance framework since 1986.  They may also argue that new 
categories of non-compliance under the WGE Act arguably cannot make a significant 
difference if the Act still depends on a ‘naming and shaming’ approach that is devoid 
of real shame.  However, the next part of this paper will demonstrate that the WGE 
Act actually has improved its compliance framework, but realising this requires an 
examination of the Act beyond its most obvious enforcement mechanisms.  It also 
requires an understanding that not all employers are swayed by the threat of sanctions.  
Some may genuinely be committed to gender equality, regardless of potential 
penalties, because they see it as good for business. Despite this commitment, if they 
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84 Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 (Cth) s 19D. 
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lack the necessary capability to implement change, this will prevent action.  In such 
cases, sanctions may be irrelevant, as the issue is capacity and not commitment.  As 
such, an effective regulatory framework needs to consider how to both influence 
resistant employers and assist willing employers.   
 
The WGE Act also retains the sanction making non-compliant employers 
ineligible to compete for Commonwealth government contracts,85 despite it never 
actually being invoked to date.  However, there is reason to believe that this sanction 
will be taken more seriously under the WGE Act, based on the context of the Act’s 
changes.  Under the EOWW Act, it was relatively easy to comply as employers 
created their own programs and it was essentially a system of mindless check-the-box 
compliance.  As a result, both the employers and EOWA likely paid less attention to 
issues of compliance.  Under the WGE Act, however, it is far more likely that the 
checking of reports will be taken more seriously.  Firstly, the WGEA has been given 
an auditing function, which allows it to check compliance with the Act or the 
minimum standards by requesting relevant information from employers.86 
 
Secondly, the introduction of minimum standards and improvement 
requirements also demonstrates that the quality of reports is being taken more 
seriously.  Employers will now also have to pay greater attention to their reports, 
which is further signified by the requirement that the Chief Executive Officer of the 
organisation sign off on the report.87  This is also important in generating the idea that 
gender issues need to be taken more seriously at the executive level.  The WGE Act !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Ibid s 18. 
86 Ibid s 19A. 
87 Ibid s 13(5). 
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also removes provisions allowing certain employers to have their reporting 
requirements waived.88  Overall, these changes send the message that the government 
is taking the reports more seriously than in the past, and as such it may be more 
willing to enforce the preclusion of non-compliant employers from the 
Commonwealth procurement framework.  This is further made apparent in the 
WGEA’s new procurement principles and user guide, which reaffirm the 
government’s commitment and aim to strengthen the former Agency’s procurement 
policy.89  Ultimately, however, it is only possible to guess whether this sanction will 
be utilised, as under the Act there still appears to be a discretion: non-compliant 
employers ‘may’ not be eligible to compete for government contracts.90     
 
The WGE Act ultimately appears to retain the unsatisfactory ‘naming and 
shaming’ provision and the under utilised government procurement sanction as its 
main enforcement mechanisms.  Although we have seen that the WGE Act has made 
a number of other improvements relating to substantive outcomes, some critics may 
question whether this can be enough if the Act does not go further in encouraging 
compliance.  This paper, however, will demonstrate that the effectiveness of the WGE 
Act is not dependent on these enforcement mechanisms.  The key to understanding 
the real value of the WGE Act is to not utilise a narrow conception of law which 
views legislation’s effectiveness as dependent on enforceable rules and sanctions.  
The next part of this paper will demonstrate that the better approach to take when 
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evaluating the WGE Act’s potential is to investigate the full regulatory framework of 
the Act.  This requires a broader perspective on what types of regulatory tools are 
available to support rules.  Particularly, an understanding of the WGE Act’s use of 
informational regulation can reveal how new developments in the Act, such as 
information disclosure requirements and the WGEA’s educational functions, can have 
a significant role in encouraging compliance.  The next part of this paper will further 
demonstrate that these alternative regulatory methods are equally important to legal 
regulation as hard sanctions.   
 
III A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO REGULATION 
A Hard versus Soft Regulatory Approach 
 In order to fully appreciate the WGE Act’s compliance mechanisms, we firstly 
need to examine the complete regulatory framework of the Act.  This requires us to 
look beyond the traditional idea of law as consisting of a rule and a sanction for 
breach of the rule, also known as ‘command and control’ regulation.91  Using the 
‘command and control’ model of regulation to analyse the WGE Act may lead to the 
conclusion that unless a breach of the Act is backed by a ‘hard’ sanction such as a 
penalty, the Act will be useless in achieving its objectives.  Such a conclusion reflects 
only a superficial understanding of law and regulation.  As Freiberg argues, the 
‘command and control’ model is flawed in numerous ways: it fails to recognise that 
rule-enforcement is only one of the government’s powers; it fails to acknowledge the 
role of non-state actors in regulation and it ignores global regulation and standards.92 
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Instead, to achieve a complete understanding of the WGE Act, we must firstly 
follow the advice of John Braithwaite and wean lawyers ‘off the obsession with 
regulation being only about rule compliance.’93  Secondly, we require a theoretical 
regulatory framework that reflects this new perspective of law and can be utilised in 
an analysis of the Act.  Recent regulatory literature can assist in this second 
requirement, as it has been shifting its focus away from ‘command and control’ 
regulation.94  Particularly in the area of labour law, there is growing recognition that 
governments now have a wider range of regulatory tools at their when disposal 
attempting to influence behaviour.95  Howe and Landau rightly recognise that an 
analysis only considering ‘hard’ law will give an ‘incomplete picture’ of how work is 
regulated in Australia.96  In the regulatory literature, we now see greater consideration 
of what is considered ‘soft or light touch’ regulatory approaches, which includes 
methods such as: conditions on government procurement contracts, requiring 
corporations to develop codes of practice and the imposition of public disclosure 
requirements.97 
 
Freiberg has argued against the use of terminology such as ‘hard vs soft’ and 
traditional vs alternative’ when examining regulatory design.98  In Freiberg’s view, 
regulation should not be evaluated in terms of whether it is ‘hard’ or ‘soft’, but !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 John Braithwaite, 'The Essence of Responsive Regulation' (2011) 44 University of 
British Columbia Law Review 475, 500. 
94 Freiberg, The Tools of Regulation, above n 16, 83; Smith, ‘A Regulatory Analysis 
of the Sex Discrimination Act’, above n 20, 106. 
95 Howe and Landau, above n 14, 369. 
96 Ibid 371. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Arie Freiberg, 'Re-stocking the Regulatory Tool-kit' (Working Paper No 15, 
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whether it is ‘it is effective, efficient and just and whether the transaction costs 
involved are reasonable and proportionate.’99  Whilst Freiberg’s points are valid, this 
paper utilises the terms ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ as useful way of distinguishing the different 
tools, which is in line with the conventional approach taken in the literature.  
Nonetheless, Freiberg’s suggestion highlights an important issue: using these terms 
may lead to the impression that soft regulation is not really about law, or should be 
afforded a lower status in a hierarchy of regulatory tools.  On the contrary, soft 
regulation is equally relevant when undertaking legal analysis of legislation, as it is 
necessary in order to properly gauge the intended operation of an Act. 
 
Freiberg also argues that regulation is not just about enforcement.100  It is true 
that regulation operates to change behaviour regardless of whether enforcement is 
necessary,101 and the WGE Act also intends to affect the behaviour of employers who 
are willing to participate but may lack the necessary capacity.  However, evaluating 
the ability of soft regulation to encourage compliance in the case of an employer who 
may resist change is particularly necessary as this is the more contentious issue 
relevant to gender equality legislation. Cases where employers are resistant also 
particularly highlight the opportunity to utilise the law in a way that may achieve 
social change.  Nonetheless, Part III B2 will also consider how the regulatory 
framework can assist willing but incapable employers, as this is also central to 
understanding how the WGE Act can be effective in achieving its objectives.  
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B Informational Regulation Theory in Context 
One model of regulation that has been created as an alternative to command 
and control theory and has received the most attention in Australia is the idea of 
‘responsive regulation’ first developed by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite.102  Their 
theory is based on the idea that regulators need to be responsive to the realities of 
regulated actors and the environment in which they operate.103  The model is 
characterised by a ‘pyramid of sanctions,’ where enforcement mechanisms escalate as 
you move up the pyramid in response to non-compliance.104  For example, at the base 
of the pyramid you would find mechanisms such as education or persuasion.105  As 
you move up the pyramid, the sanctions would escalate to naming and shaming and 
then to more punitive approaches such as penalties.106    
 
 Although much of the recent literature has considered the pyramid model 
when undertaking regulatory analysis,107 including in the area of sex discrimination 
law,108 this paper contends that the pyramid model would not be the best means to 
undertake an analysis of the WGE Act.  The intended operation of the WGE Act 
reveals that it was not created with an enforcement pyramid in mind.  The WGE Act 
cannot be considered a complete pyramid, as its enforcement mechanisms are focused !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992).  
103 Ibid 4. 
104 Ibid 4-5. See also John Braithwaite, ‘The Essence of Responsive Regulation’, 
above n 93, 480-484. 
105 John Braithwaite, ‘The Essence of Responsive Regulation’, above n 93, 482. 
106 Ibid. 
107 See, eg, Howe and Landau, above n 14, 394; Smith, ‘Not the Baby and the 
Bathwater’, above n 46, 705.  
108 See especially Smith, ‘A Regulatory Analysis of the Sex Discrimination Act’, 
above n 20, 108-109. 
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solely on tools that would come from the bottom of the pyramid, such as education.  
Without the more coercive sanctions, the Act not only lacks a complete pyramid, but 
the central feature of the theory.  Ayres and Braithwaite’s model relies on the idea 
that the soft tools at the bottom of the pyramid can be made more effective by the 
looming threat of the hard tools at the top of the pyramid.109  As such, this theory, 
although containing some useful aspects, ultimately cannot assist in answering our 
question of how can the WGE Act can be effective despite the lack of hard sanctions.  
As Freiberg points out, the risk of using the pyramidal approach is that we will focus 
too much on enforcement and not enough on the ‘day to day’ influences on behaviour, 
such as codes of conduct, guidelines and information provision.110  
 
 Instead, this paper proposes that the WGE Act is best analysed through a 
different and less explored regulatory theory known as informational regulation.  The 
use of informational regulation as an alternative to command and control regulation 
has been particularly considered in the context of environmental protection policy,111 
but it has yet to be comprehensively considered in the context of Australian equal 
employment opportunity legislation.  Informational regulation is premised on the idea 
that by requiring large companies to disclose certain information, stakeholders will 
then exert the necessary pressure to force compliance.112   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Freiberg classifies information regulation into three main forms.113  Firstly, 
legislation requiring information disclosure comprises a major part of this type of 
regulation, particularly as a way for governments to redress information 
asymmetries.114  Although Freiberg considers disclosure legislation primarily in the 
context of consumers,115 the theory can still be usefully applied in the context of 
gender equality in workplaces.  Without disclosure requirements, it would be difficult 
for most employees or other interested actors to access relevant information held by 
employees.  The WGE Act recognises this and requires reports to be disclosed to 
employees and unions.116   
 
A second form of informational regulation involves the government providing 
information in order to generate ‘attitude change, capability development and norm 
formation or modification.’117  This is particularly important in the context of gender 
equality, as achieving change in workplaces requires the challenging of attitudes and 
norms as well as enabling employers to build the necessary processes and knowledge.  
This form of informational regulation encompasses a wide range of tools, such as: 
advice, education, training, advertising, information campaigns and legislative 
summaries.118  The WGE Act utilises such tools mainly through the WGEA, which 
has particularly been given the role of providing advice and assistance to employers 
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that fail to meet the minimum standards.119  However, the WGEA is not limited to 
assisting only employers in breach, as it also has the function of undertaking general 
research and educational campaigns aimed at improving gender equality in 
workplaces.120  The WGEA’s website provides such information and research reports, 
as well as legislative summaries to assist in understanding the new legislation.121  The 
WGEA is not even limited to assisting employers covered by the Act.  It has been 
given a new function of advising employers who are not required to report under the 
WGE Act on how to achieve gender equality in their workplaces.122  In this sense, the 
educational scope of the WGEA has been broadened compared to former versions of 
the Agency under previous legislation.123   
 
Performance indicators or ‘report cards’ are the third form of informational 
regulation.124  This form intends to provide information about performance to the 
public as well as feedback to regulatees, who will then be able to judge their own 
performance according to the standard.125  In the WGE Act, this takes the form of the 
employers’ reports and GEIs (and the later introduction of the minimum standards).  
According to Freiberg, the use of mandated performance indicators is based on the 
presumption that standards will rise after public disclosure due to ‘shaming’ of weak 
performers.126  Yet, we have seen in the context of the AA(EOW) and EOWW Acts 
that naming and shaming was not a very effective enforcement mechanism.  As such, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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it may appear that applying informational regulation cannot provide an answer to our 
question of how the WGE Act can still be effective despite using this same 
enforcement mechanism.  By taking the broader approach to regulation, however, it is 
possible to see how the performance indicator tool can be bolstered through the other 
two main forms of informational regulation: disclosure and education.    
 
Before elaborating on these two components of the WGE Act, it is important 
to return to one particular criticism of the AA(EOW) and EOWW Acts: the reliance 
on self-regulation.  Thornton was particularly critical of the use self-regulation, 
viewing it as toothless and a product of the government’s deregulation agenda.127  We 
saw that in the past legislation, the problem was that it was left to employers to 
essentially decide what they would achieve.  The WGE Act has addressed part of the 
issue through changes such as the GEIs and minimum standards.  Yet in order to fully 
appreciate the WGE Act’s changes, the necessity of corporate self-regulation needs to 
be understood.  Firstly, this requires recognition that self-regulation is not necessarily 
the same as deregulation.128  This has been a key a concept within the literature 
considering regulatory alternatives to the command and control model.  For example, 
Ayres and Braithwaite’s work on responsive regulation aimed to ‘transcend’ the 
debate of state regulation of businesses versus deregulation in a neo-liberal society.129  
 
New regulatory theory has instead created the idea of ‘meta-regulation,’ which 
involves the state regulating the self-regulation being undertaken by actors such as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 Thornton, ‘Proactive or reactive?’, above n 11, 285-6; Thornton, ‘EEO in a Neo-
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corporations.130  In the context of the WGE Act, we have seen that this involves 
employers reporting on the effectiveness of their self-regulation in relation to 
specified goals.  The ‘meta-regulation’ aspect is that this report then enables the self-
regulation to be assessed by the WGEA.  Meta-regulation provides a more 
sophisticated way for the state to utilise organisations’ ability to self-regulate, rather 
than simply relying on deregulation.  Christine Parker highlights the requirements 
necessary in order for this model to work.131  Firstly, as this model relies on the 
willingness of corporations to utilise their internal capacity to self-regulate, law and 
regulators need to generate internal commitment within corporations.132  Secondly, 
law and regulators should increase external accountability mechanisms, including 
judgment by the public and stakeholders.133  
 
 This paper will apply informational regulation theory to the WGE Act in order 
to also show how the Act intends to facilitate adequate meta-regulation along the lines 
of Parker’s model.  Ultimately, the link between these two regulatory theories will 
reveal that it is possible to change the behaviour of employers such that they will 
comply with the WGE Act, regardless of whether there is a threat of hard sanctions.  
 
1 Information Disclosure and Consultation under the WGE Act  
 We have seen that based on Parker’s model of meta-regulation, public 
accountability mechanisms will be central to encouraging employers to comply with 
the WGE Act.  Paradoxically, we have also seen that making employers publicly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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accountable through ‘naming and shaming’ has achieved very little in practice.  
Examining the use of informational regulation in the form of disclosure in the WGE 
Act may allow us to reconcile these competing notions.  The WGE Act contains a 
number of information disclosure requirements.  Firstly, the submission of the 
employer reports to the WGEA itself is one type of information disclosure, 
particularly targeted at rectifying an information asymmetry between the government 
and employers.   However, for our purposes it is the new disclosure requirements 
relating to third parties that provide a more useful insight into the WGE Act’s 
potential effectiveness.  Before examining these new requirements, an exploration of 
the consultation requirements under the WGE Act can provide a useful context for 
how disclosure to relevant stakeholders may operate to encourage compliance.  
 
 Under the WGE Act, we saw that the fifth GEI requires employers to report on 
consultation with employees on issues concerning gender equality in the workplace.  
This GEI prevents employers from sweeping gender issues under the rug, as 
employers will likely need to inform employees of current gender equality issues in 
order to engage in the consultation.  It also allows employees to be proactively 
included in the employer’s regulation process before the report is completed.  As 
Smith argues, it is important for regulatory schemes to enable workers to participate 
in the framing of gender equality issues because it is the workers who will be directly 
affected by the employer’s conduct.134  The fifth GEI aims to achieve this, but the 
government also appears to recognise the potential for employers to engage in 
ineffective consultation.  Accordingly, the 2013 Instrument provides for further 
matters to be included in the reports, which will likely assist the WGEA in evaluating 
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the consultation undertaken.  Under the 2013 Instrument, employers must specify the 
mode of consultation and the categories of employees consulted.135  Including the 
categories of employees consulted is particularly important because it will reveal 
whether employers actually consult with the employees that are to be affected by the 
policies, as opposed to just upper management.  
 
Apart from potential problems with the quality of consultation undertaken, 
past versions of the Act reveal that there is also a potential problem of employers not 
complying with the consultation requirements at all.  The requirement to consult with 
employees is not new.  Under the AA(EOW) Act, employers were required to consult 
with female employees and trade unions when developing their affirmative action 
program.136  Despite this requirement, a 1994 Agency review of compliance with the 
eight steps program found that the consultation steps were ‘poorly performed’.137  
These consultation requirements were then removed in the EOWW Act.  Although 
compliance had been weak, this move was criticised by commentators as a further 
way the EOWW Act diminished Australia’s equal employment opportunity 
framework.138  Even though the WGE Act has responded by reintroducing 
consultation requirements, the remaining issue is why would the Act achieve 
compliance here when the AA(EOW) Act could not?  This also reflects our more 
general question of what makes the WGE Act different so as to inspire compliance?  
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The answer to these questions leads us to the new disclosure requirements 
involving third parties under the WGE Act.  Under the Act, employers are now 
required to inform employees, shareholders and unions of the lodgement of the 
report.139  They must also provide the employees and shareholders with access to the 
report (whether electronic or otherwise).140  Lastly, employers must inform employees 
and unions that they have an opportunity to comment on the report and they may give 
those comments to either the employer or the WGEA.141  If the comments are 
submitted to the employer within 28 days after the report has been submitted, the 
employer will be able to take the comments into account when providing additional 
information to the WGEA.142  Likewise, comments sent to the Agency within 28 days 
will allow the WGEA to consider the comments when requesting additional 
information under s 19A as part of reviewing the employer’s compliance under the 
Act.143 
 
These changes, particularly the employees and unions’ opportunity to 
comment, have been considered a significant development.  Even the sceptical 
Thornton has written, in response to these new requirements, that ‘for the first time in 
almost three decades, the legislation seeks to move from a solely procedural focus to a 
tentative regard for substantive equality.’144  The value of these new disclosure 
requirements is that the WGE Act is recognising actors other than employers as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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regulators for the first time.  This creates a new way that the legal system can 
influence the internal cultures of organisations, because employers will have to 
answer to their employees as regulators, in addition to government regulators.  Parker 
has also particularly espoused this idea in her work on new regulatory approaches 
toward corporate self-regulation.145  Unlike command and control regulatory theory 
that does not recognise the potential for other actors as regulators,146 Parker 
acknowledges that a key part of effective corporate self-regulation is to allow for 
feedback from ‘external stakeholders.’147  Lastly, by turning these other actors into 
regulators, the WGE Act also adds another layer of support to the government’s 
attempt to rectify the information asymmetry, because it means the government is not 
solely relying on employers to provide information.   
 
The WGE Act operates not to force substantive outcomes prescriptively, but 
by requiring the disclosure of information, which in turns enables stakeholders to 
impose internal pressure.  This provides a more sophisticated use of the law than past 
versions of the Act, as it adds a backup accountability mechanism even for situations 
where ‘naming and shaming’ may not inspire compliance.  The difference with the 
disclosure approach is that the comments, particularly from employees, have the 
potential to hit employers closer to home than a distant criticism from the 
government.  Employers may be more willing to genuinely consult with employees as 
regulatory actors under the fifth GEI, as well as comply with the Act in general, if 
they face the risk of discontent from their workforce.  This is also true regardless of 
whether hard sanctions like penalties are utilised, because it is the internal pressure !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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that employers are responding to rather than the risk of paying a fee.  The WGE Act’s 
use of information disclosure is critical to the success of this model.  Without 
mandatory disclosure, most employees may never even become aware of the 
existence of the reports let alone of the opportunity to comment.  Also, some 
employers may never feel the need to still include employees in the process.  This was 
highlighted in KPMG’s 2009 review of the EOWW Act, which found that a 
significant number of employees, particularly women, were not aware of employee 
involvement in developing and evaluating workplace programs.148  
 
The use of law to turn employees into regulators (by enabling their comments 
on employers’ reports) may also prevent the employer from presenting its progress 
more favourably than the workplace’s reality.  We saw this problem arise in the 
context of reports under the AA(EOW) Act, when Strachan and Burgess found that 
employers were overstating the actions they had taken in areas like childcare 
assistance.149  North-Samardzic’s study into the weaknesses of the EOWW Act’s 
reporting process revealed similar problems.150  North-Samardzic undertook 
interviews with participants from three organisations representing different sectors 
(non-profit, university and private sector financial services).151  She particularly 
utilised organisations that were recipients of EOWA’s Employer of Choice for 
Women award.152  Despite this, participants from the University of Macarthur and 
Townbank (a financial services organisation) revealed that the reporting process did 
not reflect the reality of gender equality at these workplaces.  At Townbank, for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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example, press releases and documents particularly featured the company’s flexible 
work practices as an example of EEO initiatives.153  However, interviews with women 
revealed that the policy was promoted, but ‘not necessarily utilised’ due to claims of 
business feasibility.154   
 
North-Samardzic findings show that there is a risk of ignoring the disconnect 
between the practices claimed by employers in reports and the actual experiences of 
female employees, because reports may be obscured by policies acting as ‘window-
dressing.’155  North-Samardzic blamed the EOWW Act’s accountability mechanisms 
favouring managerial discretion for this result.156  Arguably, the WGE Act’s 
disclosure changes have remedied this.   For example, employees and unions could 
now provide comments on the reality of flexible work arrangements under the fourth 
GEI.  In a situation where the employer claims to have policies supporting flexible 
working arrangements, but really the policies are rarely enacted, employees’ 
comments would now be able to reveal instances where requests for such 
arrangements were refused.   
 
Another risk revealed by North-Samardzic’s study is that reliance on 
organisational culture is vulnerable to leadership change.157  In the case of the 
University of Macarthur, this was particularly an issue as participants felt that EEO 
was better supported when the Vice Chancellor was a woman, but changes to the 
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management team lead to gender issues being put on the backburner.158  Whilst the 
WGE Act still relies on organisational culture to implement changes, it is also 
arguable that the new disclosure requirements somewhat reduce these risks.159  By 
improving accountability and transparency through disclosure and removing reporting 
waivers, the WGE Act forces employers to be reminded of their commitments.  
Employers may choose to skew their performance results or ignore gender issues, but 
this would be pointless now that employees are free to reveal the truth.  Admittedly, 
for some employers the issue will not be a lack of commitment, but resourcing 
constraints.  Whilst the WGE Act’s new accountability measures may still prevent 
employers from completely avoiding gender equality issues in such cases, its 
influence may be constrained if an employer’s bottom line is its budget. 
 
Although the WGE Act’s new disclosure system has merit and the potential to 
increase employer compliance with the Act, it is important to acknowledge that there 
may be limitations in practice.  Firstly, we need to be careful not to assume that all 
employers will be interested in the feedback they receive from employees and unions.  
In such cases, however, the allowance for comments to instead be given to the WGEA 
may assist in adding an extra layer of pressure on employers.  In addition to the 
WGEA’s power to request further information from an employer regarding their 
compliance after receiving the comments,160 employers are also non-compliant if they 
give the WGEA false or misleading information.161  As such, employers will likely 
realise that it would be futile to ignore or contradict truthful comments submitted by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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organisational culture. 
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employees or unions.  On the other hand, another potential limitation is that the 
WGEA may not be able to consider every comment received in practice.162  This will 
likely depend on the level of funding contributed to the WGEA by the government.    
 
Ultimately, the value of the WGE Act’s disclosure mechanisms depends 
heavily on the willingness of employees to engage in the process and make comments 
on the employer’s report.  As such, it may not be effective in all cases.  Firstly, there 
is a risk that employees will be unwilling to provide criticism on the report for fear of 
jeopardising their position.  This will particularly be the case if the employer does not 
institute a system allowing for employees to make their comments anonymously.  
There is no specific requirement in the WGE Act requiring employers to ensure 
anonymity.  Although comments made to the WGEA through their online submission 
system ensure personal information is kept confidential, the WGEA encourages 
comments to be made to employers at first instance.163  This may deter some 
employees who do not want to wish to confront their employers, but feel that they 
will not be taken seriously unless they take that step first.  
 
Another flaw in informational regulation theory is that it is based on the idea 
that people will understand and be capable of responding to information.164  However, 
as Freiberg points out, information ‘affects different groups in society differently.’165  
Not all employees will have the capacity to understand the reports: they may find the 
information too complex, there may be a language barrier or they may doubt their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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ability to provide an adequate response.  Even employees who are capable of 
understanding and processing the information may not possess the willingness to 
respond because they feel disempowered and believe that their contribution will not 
have any real influence over substantive outcomes in the workforce.  Or, employees 
may possess the necessary knowledge and capacity, but may not have the time to 
contribute.   
 
In these situations, the WGE Act perhaps contemplates the solution of unions 
providing comments instead of incapable or unwilling employees.  Relying on unions, 
however, may not always be a reliable solution.  As Smith argues, the decline in 
unionisation undermines the role of unions in regulatory schemes.166  The problem is 
that there may not be a union presence at that workforce or the union may not possess 
the necessary inside knowledge to comment, particularly if employees capable of 
providing relevant information are not union members.  Admittedly, this may not 
necessarily prevent unions from voluntarily undertaking comparisons of performance 
between workforces based on the reports themselves.  Parker notes that a successful 
information disclosure strategy requires the state to regulate the quality of information 
to be provided, for example, by developing standards for key performance indicators, 
in order to enable interested parties to intelligently compare performance.167  The 
WGE Act appears to have addressed this through the creation of the GEIs and later 
implementation of minimum standards.    
 
Finally, in order for the WGE Act’s information disclosure mechanism to 
achieve its intended outcome, it is not enough for the Act to simply require employers !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to provide the reports.  Employers will need to make the reports easily accessible to 
the employees and also institute a mechanism for returning comments that is not to 
cumbersome or complicated.  Otherwise, the system’s reliance on employee feedback 
may again be its downfall, particularly in the case of time-poor employees.  The WGE 
Act only provides that the employer must provide access (electronic or otherwise) as 
soon as reasonably practicable.168  Yet this does not take into account that some 
employers may choose an approach not suitable for their particular workforce.  For 
example, using email rather than snail mail to send the reports and receive comments 
back may be more appropriate for white-collar office workers.  However, while email 
may be an easier route for the employer, it is less likely to be the best approach for a 
workforce of blue-collar workers who are rarely at their desk or a computer and may 
be onsite away from the office during the day.  
 
This part has aimed to explore how a broader use of the law through a soft 
regulatory tool such as mandatory information disclosure can successfully encourage 
employers to comply with the WGE Act.  It does not, however, suggest that the use of 
information disclosure will be a successful approach in all cases.  The limitations to 
the theory have been discussed in an attempt to demonstrate that there are some 
industries or workplaces where the disclosure mechanism may not have an impact.  
Despite this, the WGE Act’s implementation of information disclosure is significant 
because it displays an understanding on the part of the legislature that there are more 
ways to bolster the effectiveness of rules other than the use of hard sanctions.  As 
such, the WGE Act is taking a step in the right direction in its attempt to improve 
Australia’s EEO regulatory framework.  
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2 Education and the WGEA  
 Education has perhaps been an underestimated area in analyses of regulation.  
In Howe and Landau’s evaluation of state labour regulation, they cite an 
overemphasis on educational strategies as one of the reasons behind laws being 
rendered ineffective.169  However, exploring education as part of the WGE Act’s 
regulatory framework is critical in determining its effectiveness. The WGE Act 
envisions the WGEA’s educational functions as being another means for both 
improving compliance and achieving substantive gender equality goals.  Rather than 
taking a punitive approach or providing for individual complaints to be taken to the 
courts, the Act proactively tries to encourage compliance through providing 
employers with assistance.170  It is true that Agencies under former versions of the Act 
were also granted educational functions, and we have seen that those Acts were 
flawed.  Howe and Landau may be correct in the sense that a reliance on educational 
strategies will probably not render effective an already ineffective legislative 
framework.   
 
The WGE Act, however, is different because not only does it use education to 
bolster the effect of the rules, but its other changes also bolster the use of education.  
The former Agency, EOWA, was able to provide information, assessment tools and 
training.171  Yet the supplying of information alone is perhaps a weak way of inspiring 
employer commitment in cases of particularly resistant employers.  This is where the 
WGE Act’s new reporting requirements may assist: the greater detail now required in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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employers’ reports firstly allows the WGEA to more accurately assess what is 
happening at workplaces.  It can also use its new power of requesting further 
information from employers when reviewing compliance to really investigate 
problematic areas.  The WGEA can then better tailor its educational programs and 
hence improve their effectiveness.  Importantly, this also sends the message that the 
WGEA is not just supplying employers with information, but it is engaging in a 
collaborative process with employers to really understand and address their specific 
concerns.  
 
Having identified that the WGE Act has improved the operation of educational 
strategies, it is now important to explore how education itself can make a difference to 
compliance with the Act.  We saw that a key requirement of Parker’s model on 
effective self-regulation was the facilitation of internal commitment within 
corporations.172  Particularly, if upper management do not care about gender equality 
issues, then they will be less likely to comply with the WGE Act or institute internal 
monitoring mechanisms.  Provision for education is crucial to achieving internal 
commitment and challenging preconceptions that employers may hold.  However, the 
use of education is not limited to just encouraging compliance from employers who 
do not already recognise the value of promoting gender equality at their workforce.  
Education is also useful for assisting employers who do wish to comply, but lack the 
necessary know how on how to change their practices.  In such cases, the value of the 
WGE Act’s regulatory framework goes beyond its enforcement mechanisms, as it 
accounts for situations where a potential sanction cannot provide a solution to non-
compliance.      
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
172 See Part III A. Parker, above n 128, 246. 
!Page 44 of 54 
 
For the first category of unwilling but able employers, education can have a 
greater influence in encouraging compliance than some critics may believe.  The key 
to success is to utilise education as a tool for changing organisational culture and 
challenging particularly masculine policies.  Maureen Fastenau’s case study on 
Deloitte particularly highlights how a change in organisational culture can make a 
significant difference to the success of equal employment opportunity policies.173  
Deloitte hired a consultancy firm to investigate the high turnover rate of its female 
accountants.174  The investigation revealed that most women had left because they felt 
dissatisfied with the organisational culture, the lack of work-family balance and the 
difficulties they faced progressing.175  Interestingly, Deloitte’s management found that 
adopting new flexible work policies did not solve the turnover problem.176  
Ultimately, management realised that they needed to address organisational culture 
and the problem of employees who utilised flexible working arrangements being 
viewed as lacking commitment.177  Deloitte was then able to successfully overhaul its 
workplace culture.178 
 
Although this case study does not appear to be directly relevant to the utilising 
of educational strategies by a government agency, its lessons can be usefully applied 
in the context of the WGE Act to show how the WGEA can potentially achieve !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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similar success.  Firstly, it shows that it is possible to demonstrate to an employer that 
addressing gender equality in its workplace can have a positive effect on the business.  
Admittedly, Deloitte may have been a more willing employer than some, especially 
when the issue was linked to a direct business concern of turnover.  As such, the first 
step would be for the WGEA to use targeted educational campaigns to illustrate how 
promoting gender equality can be good for business, even if some companies may not 
view it as particularly relevant.  In cases where this is difficult to demonstrate, the 
WGEA could also use campaigns to assert the issue as a moral obligation and 
highlight its impact on the organisation’s public image.  The next step would be to 
provide tools to assist employers with creating and enacting relevant policies in 
practice.  Lastly, and most importantly, the lesson learnt by Deloitte in relation to 
organisational culture needs to be applied.  Namely, providing these tools and then 
leaving the employer to its own devices will not be enough. The WGEA needs to 
continuously use education campaigns to encourage genuine internal interest.  This is 
where the WGEA can have its most meaningful impact in securing compliance, 
because lasting internal commitment is more likely where there is a cultural shift.  If 
senior managers are particularly convinced, the organisation is not only more likely to 
comply with the Act, but it is more likely that substantive goals will be reached at that 
workplace. 
 
 The WGE Act also appears to recognise that in order to influence 
organisational culture in a way that encourages compliance, simply prescribing rules 
and sanctions is not enough.  Rather, proactive and dynamic education and training is 
needed to truly create a change in attitude.  One particular area where education could 
have an impact is the challenging of preconceptions relating to workers with caring 
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responsibilities who utilise flexible work arrangements.  In such cases, simply 
following the rules of the WGE Act and implementing such arrangements does not 
necessarily equate to a real benefit for female workers.  Some of these workers may 
face problems of being ‘shunted to the “mommy track”’.179  They may receive poorer 
quality work and be less likely to be promoted.  Fastenau found that a cause of this is 
a belief on the part of some male managers that flexible working arrangements are 
more of a lifestyle choice, and as such reflect the woman’s lesser career 
commitment.180  The WGEA could use educational campaigns to challenge such 
conceptions and make employers understand that it is not a lifestyle choice, but rather 
a necessity for female employees trying to juggle their competing responsibilities.181    
 
 A regulatory framework that only prescribes rules and sanctions also will not 
achieve compliance in the case of organisations that are already culturally committed, 
but are struggling to implement gender equality measures.  In practice, some 
employers may find it challenging to achieve gender equality goals or to even 
understand what exactly is expected in such endeavours.  The WGE Act utilises a 
more effective regulatory framework by granting the WGEA the function of assisting 
such employers.  The WGEA is also developing a new benchmarking system, which 
will be particularly of use in such situations.  After the WGEA receives the reports 
under the new framework for 2013-14, it aims to analyse the data and also consult 
with employer groups to develop benchmarks for educational purposes.182  Employers 
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will then be able to use the benchmarks to compare their performance within the 
industry and develop gender equality strategies.183 
 
The WGEA can also have a beneficial role in assisting employers with 
implementing specific gender equality policies in practice.  For example, an employer 
may wish to create an adequate flexible working arrangement policy that avoids the 
pitfalls previously discussed.  The WGEA would be able to advise on such strategies.  
One potential solution, which worked in the case of Deloitte, is to require senior 
managers to monitor the quality of work received by women in their department 
compared to men in order to ensure their promotional opportunities were equal.184  By 
suggesting voluntary internal accountability methods, the effectiveness of the WGE 
Act could be further strengthened.  Other strategies may include appealing to 
managers’ business sensibilities by explaining that it would be more efficient to 
adequately utilise the experience of all the staff, including those with flexible work 
arrangements, when distributing workloads. 
 
 Finally, some critics may wonder why the WGE Act does not just also include 
‘hard’ strategies such as penalties as well as informational strategies such as 
education so as to cover all bases.  This paper does not suggest that ‘command and 
control’ regulation will always be inappropriate.185  Rather, it claims that for gender 
equality legislation in particular, the lack of hard sanctions does not necessarily signal 
a deficiency in the regulatory framework.  As we have seen, the WGE Act’s use of 
informational regulation allows for a broader use of law in a way that has the potential !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to inspire compliance in a range of circumstances.  Command and control regulation, 
on the other hand, can be inflexible.186  As such, it is likely not the best way of 
dealing with a complex social issue like gender equality.   
 
This becomes apparent when one considers how the use of hard sanctions 
would operate in practice.  For example, say a financial penalty is imposed if an 
employer does not meet a hypothetical minimum standard relating to flexible work 
arrangements.  Even if the penalty serves as a deterrent, it may also cause a backlash 
in some cases in the form of employers hiring less women or giving them lesser 
quality work.  We have seen that these are already issues that can be addressed 
through education strategies.  It seems redundant to add penalties to the regulatory 
framework, as they will not eliminate the need for informational regulation and are 
not necessarily more effective.  There are many layers to the gender equality issue, 
and no easy solutions.  But when devising solutions, there needs to be careful 
consideration of how a change in one area can impact another area.  Given this 
complexity, the WGE Act has taken a step in the right direction by considering the 
benefits of alternative forms of regulation like informational regulation. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 This paper has sought to demonstrate that despite almost thirty years of 
arguably ineffective equal employment opportunity legislation, there is a role for law 
to play in the facilitating of gender equality in workplaces.  All that is required is a 
rethinking of the regulatory approach.  Once we move beyond the narrow conception 
of law consisting of a rule and a sanction for breach of the rule, we can discover the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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more effective ways of utilising the law to address a complex issue like gender 
equality.  This paper has contended that the new WGE Act has made significant 
improvements on its predecessors by utilising informational regulation.  Particularly, 
the use of information disclosure and education has strengthened the Act’s regulatory 
framework.  The Act’s new approach displays a more sophisticated understanding of 
how to exert influence over actors, particularly through its regulation of corporate 
self-management by enabling employees to participate as regulators.   
 
 When Valerie Braithwaite described the AA(EOW) Act as ‘loose, gentle and 
weak’ legislation, she did not blame the Act’s ineffectiveness on these 
characteristics.187  Rather, she argued that these qualities could actually make the 
legislation more effective in the long term, as they could produce the ‘psychological 
surrender that is a necessary part of changing culture.’188  In the end, Braithwaite 
attributed the AA(EOW) Act’s ineffectiveness to its poor implementation, resourcing 
and monitoring.189  Twenty-six years later, the government appears to be following 
Braithwaite’s logic.  The fact that the WGE Act employs ‘soft’ tools of regulation, 
which may be viewed as weak by some critics, is actually the Act’s biggest chance of 
success.  The Act also appears to have rectified past problems in an attempt to make 
the most of this opportunity, particularly by improving reporting requirements 
through GEIs and minimum standards; introducing a standardised approach and 
broadening the WGEA’s functions.  Ultimately, we must wait until the WGE Act’s 
new reporting requirements have fully come into effect, including the release of the 
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minimum standards, before we will be able to see if the Act makes its intended 
impact.  
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